- William Scherer, Chair, ESE
- Robert Riggs, Advisor, ESE
- Julianne Quinn, ESE
- Manel Baucells, Darden Business School
- Kaveh Madani, Head of Research Programme at United Nations University, Research Professor at CUNY-CREST
- Maryam Esmaeili, Alzahra University
Date: May 27, 2022
Time: 11:30 AM
Zoom Meeting Information: Email the ESE Office for Zoom Information
Title: Essays on Game Theory Approaches in Environmental and Engineering Systems
This proposed thesis focuses on mathematical modeling and, more specifically, game theory concepts with applications in environmental systems such as water resource management and industrial systems such as supply chain management. It is planned to consist of four research papers; the first two studies have environmental, and the last two have industrial applications.
In the first paper, we added new analytical stages as sequential next steps on the game theory outcomes. We utilized (1) social choice voting rules and (2) introduced a novel concept called Related Games and explained how to relate the Consequential game to the Leading game and applied it to two common water resource conflicts. The second study focuses on linking issues with a game theory approach known as interconnected games. By introducing the concept of Interconnected Evolving Games, we provide a mathematical definition and apply various solution concepts as used in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution methodology and compare it with Evolving Interconnected Games. This study is ongoing, and the final draft is getting prepared. In the third study, we investigate the addition of additive manufacturing in the manufacturing system in a supply chain during a crisis such as COVID-19. The manufacturer switches from conventional manufacturing to a hybrid system which faces random yield, and the retailer has random demand influenced by the selling price. We plan to model the interaction between the manufacturer and retailer in a game theory context and obtain the optimal value of the key parameters, such as the manufacturer’s production quantity and selling price and the retailer’s order quantity. In the fourth study, we want to investigate the impact of information sharing on the performance of a two-level closed-loop supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. While the demand is uncertain, the manufacturer and the retailer have private information about the demand. We intend to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium for retail price, wholesale price, and the collecting rate of the used products and then compare and analyze their profits under information and no information sharing scenarios.